U.S. Strikes in Yemen: Between Houthi Escalation and Regional Hesitation
In light of the recent U.S. airstrikes targeting Houthi positions in Yemen, the general mood inside the country appears increasingly fragmented, with three main currents emerging—each holding distinct views on the operations and their significance.
The first current represents the Houthi public opinion—a closed ideological stance driven by a highly organized propaganda machine. This current sees the strikes not as a threat, but as an opportunity to expand the scope of war and justify further escalation. These attacks are perceived as additional fuel to fortify the internal front and legitimize what the group refers to as a “legitimate response.”
The second current reflects public anger at the official Yemeni government, which many now view as having squandered a valuable opportunity. These strikes, it is argued, should have marked a strategic turning point to reignite internal battlefronts and leverage international momentum to deliver a double blow that weakens the Houthis. This current is growing steadily, adopting increasingly harsh rhetoric toward the government, viewing its inaction and complacency as a forfeiture of a historic moment.
Conversely, a third current adopts a more skeptical and passive outlook, arguing that the airstrikes have so far failed to produce any meaningful breakthrough within the Houthi structure, particularly at the political and military leadership levels. This group believes that continued targeting of mountainous outposts and fortifications—already repeatedly struck by the Saudi-led coalition—will yield little tangible result. On the contrary, it may actually reinforce the group’s internal cohesion.
Amid this divided landscape, credible military and political assessments agree that any real shift in the balance of power can only be achieved through a ground confrontation, supported by local tribes or internal resistance forces in Houthi-controlled areas, with American logistical backing. However, this scenario continues to clash with the hesitant stances of Saudi Arabia and the UAE—likely rooted in concerns over direct retaliation via Houthi missiles and drones—limiting their willingness to commit to direct military involvement.
As Yemenis watch anxiously, there is growing recognition that airstrikes alone will not suffice unless coupled with internal support for anti-Houthi forces and the ignition of a decisive ground campaign. Without such a move, time—based on past experience—may ultimately work in favor of the Houthis, reshaping the balance of power in a manner even more damaging to the legitimacy and prospects of state restoration.
Given the current field and political realities, any negotiated outcome or diplomatic settlement that allows the Houthis to emerge from this round of strikes without a significant strategic cost will be perceived locally, regionally, and internationally as a political victory for the group. Such a scenario would not only bolster their propaganda narrative but also reinforce in their mindset the notion that targeting international shipping lanes is a repeatable tactic whenever Iranian interests call for it.
The Houthis do not view escalation as a mere reactive measure, but rather as part of a strategic function within a broader proxy war serving Iran’s regional expansionist agenda. Any resolution that spares the group the consequences of current strikes will thus be interpreted as a sign of international weakness—later used as leverage for renewed blackmail, further destabilizing the security landscape of the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Arabian Sea in both the near anddistantfuture.
