Recent moves by Iran-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and integrate their members into state security institutions do not signify a reduction in Iranian influence, but rather a strategic rearrangement of influence tools and the entrenchment of a "deep state" built by Tehran within Iraq's governance structures over years.
British political analyst Jonathan Spyer contends that the American and Western reception of decisions by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and the Imam Ali Brigades, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, to surrender their weapons to the Iraqi state is based on an overly optimistic assessment. This view interprets these actions as indicators of Baghdad reclaiming its sovereignty and diminishing the influence of Iran-linked armed groups.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq announced the formation of a special committee to oversee the handover process and inventory its weapons, while the Imam Ali Brigades stated their decision was motivated by "national responsibility," fostering national unity, and preserving the gains of victory. U.S. Special Envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrett, lauded these steps, deeming them foundational for a new era of independent Iraqi governance and supportive of restored sovereignty and stability.
However, the analysis suggests this interpretation overlooks the nature of ongoing transformations within the camp of Iran-aligned forces. Spyer notes these developments followed cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's announcement of integrating the armed capabilities of Saraya al-Salam into state institutions, raising questions about whether Iraq is witnessing the dismantling of the militia system established over the past two decades. The author refutes this, asserting that the events are not about dismantling Iranian influence but rather re-engineering its instruments to ensure sustained control through more entrenched and less internationally scrutinized methods.
The analysis places the head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, at the center of these shifts, describing him as a key decision-maker and influential figure shaping political balances. According to the analysis, Zaidan is not an adversary of the Iranian project in Iraq but an integral part of its political and institutional framework. The author cites previous U.S. research that highlighted Zaidan's role during the post-2021 election government formation crisis, where judicial decisions from the Federal Court obstructed efforts by anti-Iranian factions to form a majority government, subsequently paving the way for pro-Tehran factions to regain prominence.
The analysis points out that Iranian influence in Iraq is no longer solely reliant on traditional armed militias but has permeated the state's political, judicial, and security institutions, making claims of its decline due to some factions surrendering weapons highly exaggerated. The author suggests that the actions of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades represent an attempt by a political network linked to Faiq Zaidan to bolster its position within the Iraqi system and redistribute power centers to mitigate risks from U.S. pressure and sanctions, without undermining Iranian influence itself.
Furthermore, the analysis highlights that existing conflicts among influential Shiite figures and factions in Iraq, such as disputes between Nouri al-Maliki's camp and rivals, indicate internal competition for influence and interests within the Tehran-aligned bloc, rather than a division between pro-Iranian and anti-Iranian forces. Spyer concludes that the ongoing events in Baghdad do not signify a triumph of Iraqi sovereignty or a receding grip of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard but rather demonstrate the adaptability and self-regeneration of the Iranian project within state institutions. The integration of militias into official bodies may, in essence, represent a transition from direct military influence to a deeper, more sustainable institutional influence, ensuring the continuation of Iranian sway in Iraq amidst increasing international pressure.
