Turkey, in the long term, can certainly exacerbate the existing tensions in Yemen and cause additional problems. There is no evidence that Turkey has had any problems or conflicts with Houthis, in fact, there is increasing evidence of some level of cooperation and coordination between Turkey backed fighters and Yemen Al Islah forces and Houthis. say Irina Tsukerman, the human rights and national security attorney and analyst based in New York.
Yemen Details has the honor to interview the American expert, Irina Tsukerman, about the threat Turkey and Qatar pose to Yemen, and how Qatar-Turkish alliance can further splinter Yemenis and cause problems for the Coalition goals:
Yemen Details: Does Turkey pose a real threat to Yemen ... and how can the war in Shakra of Shabwa be viewed?
Tsukerman: Turkey, in the long term, can certainly exacerbate the existing tensions in Yemen and cause additional problems. Turkey's greatest danger is ideological, because even when it fails to meet its goals militarily, such as the reconsolidation of power by Assad in Syria, where Turkey influenced territories are increasingly marginalized, it is successful in recruiting followers through humanitarian outreach, educational indoctrination, and radicalization in the mosques.
For now, it's involvement in Yemen is limited to some recruitment camps, but there has already been evidence of a couple of hundred Al Islah members being recruited to fight as mercenaries in Libya, which points to Turkey's increasingly successful globalization of conflicts.
Furthermore, it is currently training some Al Islah fighters presumably to mobilize them against STC and other Yemeni forces, not against Houthis.
There is no evidence that Turkey has had any problems or conflicts with Houthis, in fact, there is increasing evidence of some level of cooperation and coordination between Turkey backed fighters and Al Islah forces and Houthis, even if Al Islah started out seeing Houthis as a problem.
Turkey is impecunious but Qatar is willing to bankroll all these operations, and there is no reason not to believe it won't invest into causing more problems for the Arab Coalition and any Yemenis who are openly aligned with the Coalition objectives. Indeed, we have even seen recent evidence from a German security report htat Qatar has been bankrolling Hezbullah, which trains the Houthis among many others. So Qatar-Turkish alliance can further splinter Yemenis and cause problems for the Coalition goals; they can cause further divide within the Hadi government over Al Islah, they can facilitate the alliance between Al Islah and Houthis, and they can radicalize even non-Islamist population in various ways.
Yemen Details: Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Yemen's Brotherhood, and Houthi .. How to understand their complex relationships and their role in the present conflicts in Yemen?
Tsukerman: Iran has a tense but working relationship with Turkey; Turkey has been working with Iran on many common issues for many years - against Kurds, circumventing US sanctions through various schemes, involving gold, and they have even signed agreement on religious outreach which shows Turkey's success in bringing together a coalition of Shi'a and Islamists of the Brotherhood variety and whoever else is willing to work against the West. Qatar is bankrolling all these operations.
Houthis are an Iranian proxy but like Hezbullah and other major terrorist organizations backed by Iran, they are willing to work and coordinate with beneficial revolutionary minded factions against Westerners, Saudis, and whoever else gets in the way of their quest to power.
So although these groups have somewhat distinct interests in Yemen, and at some point Turkey/Qatar and Iranian interest might be in competition, for now, their main goal is to expel the US and the Coalition from Yemen and to radicalize the population and to consolidate joint power, the eventual divisions will come later, but they are working on the process from both ends.
Yemen Details: The conflict over Al Hujaria in Turbah of Taiz, can it be linked to the struggles of axes Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, or not?
Tsukerman: Yes, the Al Hujaria operations are directly related to Turkey/Qatar challenge to Saudi Arabia. Turkey and Qatar are part of an "Islamist Quartet" which has the purpose of off setting the Anti-Terrorist Quartet led by Saudi Arabia, and of course, to challenge Saudi ideological influence and investment in the region through political, ideological, religious, military, humanitarian, and economic means. This is exactly what they are doing in Taiz, working to train fighters that can present a military challenge, forging clandestine intelligence relationship, spreading ideological radicalization that can off set the more open reformist outlook by the Saudis, and in general to present themselves as leaders in the region and a superpower creating a caliphate while portraying Saudi Arabia as incompetent and as serving narrow self-serving goals that cannot lead to any greatness or power for Yemenis.
Taiz is a starting point and so are the operations there; if successful, similar projects will be implemented elsewhere, and if victorious, Turkey and Qatar will have the pshychological momentum that may inspire following among the frustrated residents of other nearby regions who will want to be siding with the stronger horse that appears to have more heart in the fight and more invested into an aggressive pursuit of victory.
That is why it's very important for Saudis to prevail there and to cut out this demoralizing attack, which is at least as much information warfare/psy ops as it is a purely military and ideological incursion.
of course fighting in a mountainous region is not easy even if you know the area, that is why both sides are heavily reliant on local forces to fight it out for them.
For Saudi to prevail it is not just enough for them to maintain the loyalty of their own supporters in spite of Turkish pressure and disinformation and so forth, but they also need to succeed in undermining Turkish/Qatari efforts in recruiting followers who know the terrain. Ground game is very important here, and whoever figures out the path of unconventional asymmetrical warfare in a convoluted region, will be able to make significant breakthroughs. This is not going to be a quick fight at all; and it will be a fight as much over the hearts and minds as over the territory, because without the local terrain expertise neither side can prevail.
Yemen Details: Given the Turkish military presence in Somalia and its intervention in Libya ... Were the international parties expecting these Turkish initiatives?
Tsukerman: Turkey itself has been fairly open about its interests in Yemen, through its followers, its humanitarian outreach via Somalia, and the fact that is openly recruiting fighters both for local effort and as mercenaries for Libya. That said, I think many countries underestimated Turkey's commitment to its neo-Ottoman Caliphate project, due to the heavy losses it has suffered in Syria, and the international problems it has created for itself int he Eastern Mediterranian.
Any military involvement requires a significant commitment of military resources, financial, and also moral support and backing from its population. Turkish population is increasingly turned off by Turkey's version of religion; and even those who have earlier supported Turkey's involvement in Syria after being sold that these movements are for national security reasons may have trouble understanding and appreciating why Turkey is getting involved in Yemen, which is already a highly sectarian ground from many conflicts and issues, and when it is heavily dependent on other countries for financial support, while the internal economy is tanking.
And while Western countries may not be eager to extend themselves to direct involvement in Yemen, they also may not wish to see it turn into a hub for terrorism, which is exactly what happens with every place where Turkey and Qatar get involved. No one should be surprised that Turkey is continuing to expand its outreach and influence, but it is surprising that it is doing so quickly and aggressively despite being increasingly unpopular with all the countries whose support it needs to retain influence nearby.
However, this just goes to show, that perhaps NATO and others who are supposed to stand against aggressive imperialism are ill suited and ill prepared for the modern day verison of it and that their internal issues, divisions, and vulnerabilities are sufficiently great that even as a grossly unpopular player Turkey is able to play off of them and while everyone else is undecided as to the course of action to take, it simply proceeds on wards through a perceived vaccum of power.
Yemen Details: Islah party, whose leaders are distributed between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar .. What is the future of this party, then?
Tsukerman: With Al Islah, it is increasingly looking like whatever commitments they have made to Saudis and the Arab coalition, either they were not honest about their goals to begin with or they ended up being subverted at some point.
Whatever the case may be their very presence is sufficiently controversial that it is having the effect of splintering the Coalition over their involvement, and therefore, it is by definition splintering the united effort against Houthis.
Al Islah was always ideologically closer to Turkey and Qatar. The only reason why they ever had a seat at the table with Saudi Arabia because their numbers were sufficient that they could provide a necessary bulwark against the Houthis.
However, since those early days several things happened that have changed the calculus:
1- The Houthis extended their reach in more ways than one far beyond where they were in the beginning of the war.
2- Turkey and Qatar became much more aggressively involved in those efforts.
3- Th Arab Coalition has been weakened by a mixture of internal strife, political pressure from the UN, disinformation campaigns in Western media, and Iran's and Turkey/Qatar's joining forces against them in Yemen as much as other parts of the region, which is significantly worse than when Iran was the only major actor on the scene.
Due to these issues, Al Islah no longer feel threatened by Houthis but increasingly sees them as potential partners, due to common interests, and also the international community increasingly treats the Houthis as victors and as a legitimate authority in Yemen, whereas the official government is by and large not present, so for Al Islah it makes sense to at the very least hedge their bets and to have a bridge to those who are from its perspective more likely to prevail, and also this is an opportunity for them to subvert the Coalition and to impose their own influence and ideas on the population.
Every wehre where Islamists come to power their governance model is corrupt, weak, ineffective, and self serving, but in the process they make grandiose promises and they manage to antagonize populations against some perceived external scapegoats, in this instance that scapegoat being not Houthis, but Saudis. That's exactly where everything is going. Al Islah is looking to expand and exert tis own control, to displace the Hadi government, to weaken everybody else by inciting conflict among other Yemenis, and eventually to come some governance arrangement and coordination over division of territories with Houthis.
From Saudi perspective then, if they cannot rein in t he leaders residing in KSA, and get them tor reverse course and to focus on the Houthis
Then they should focus on uniting all other Yemenis - STC, SNC, and other coalitions, bringing them together, and reacting to Al Islah as part of a problem. Whereas in the beginning it was perhaps possible for them to make these arrangements with Al Islah out of necessity, Al Islah has positioned itself in a way that alienates other possible supporters who are more committed to fighting the Houthis
and if the main goal is to fight the Houthis, if AL Islah is no longer part of that solution, really, then it should be fought, not just politically but ideologically, and resources need to be invested to counter its influence. If AL Islah sees itself as growing and prevailing in numbers it can feel that it controls the Coalition, that Saudis are dependent on them more than on Hadi's government or others, that they are the real power brokers, and that they can dictate the terms of future developments That cannot be allowed to happen. Their influence should be minimized to the point that they can either be reigned in and used according to the plan, or else become completely unnecessary. They should not be allowed to further splinter the coalition in any way.
