The primary U.S. concern ahead of potential nuclear negotiations with Iran centers on the substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium amassed by Tehran, much of which is believed to have survived recent Israeli and U.S. attacks on its nuclear facilities.
While specific details remain undisclosed and Iran has not allowed inspectors access to verify the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated significant quantities prior to the bombings. These included approximately 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%, 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%, and substantial amounts enriched to lower levels (5% and 2%). According to IAEA benchmarks, the 60% enriched uranium, if further processed, would be sufficient for roughly ten nuclear weapons.
The United States insists that Iran must not possess the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. The focus on the 60% enriched uranium stems from its relative ease and speed in being further enriched to weapons-grade levels (around 90%). The process of increasing enrichment levels becomes exponentially easier as the purity rises; enriching from 60% to 90% is considerably less complex than enriching from natural uranium to 5%.
The international community's concerns are amplified by the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, which had previously restricted Iran's enrichment activities to 3.67%. Following the U.S. exit, Iran significantly expanded its nuclear program. While moving and securing nuclear material like highly enriched uranium is a sensitive but feasible process, its ultimate disposition remains a critical point of contention.
Reports from Iranian sources suggest a potential willingness to transfer half of the 60% enriched material to a third country in exchange for 5% enriched uranium, while diluting the remainder domestically. However, directives from Iran's supreme leader reportedly indicate a stance against the complete removal of this material from the country.
