Sudanese civilian factions express significant concern that the ongoing conflict is being leveraged to reinstate the political influence of Islamists, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, by forging alliances with the military establishment and exploiting potential negotiation processes.
The debate surrounding Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's call for an intra-Sudanese dialogue has intensified, with anti-war civilian groups contending that the initiative fails to establish equitable conditions for such discussions. They argue that conducting political processes from within areas controlled by the army could provide allied forces with an opportunity to re-establish their political presence.
Civilian forces participating in the Addis Ababa meeting believe the threat extends beyond the military's continued prominence in politics, highlighting the potential for the war to serve as a gateway for the return of groups associated with the former regime and the Islamist movement, capitalizing on the nation's polarized military and political landscape. Following the December revolution that ousted Omar al-Bashir's regime, the official influence of Islamists within state institutions waned. However, the outbreak of hostilities has reshuffled the political order, creating new avenues for movement for some groups linked to the previous regime, particularly in army-controlled regions.
The scenario cautioned against by these civilian groups involves a transition from military-Islamist cooperation on the ground to an attempt to forge a political front for this alliance through negotiation or a national dialogue whose terms and outcomes are managed by specific parties. Consequently, the conflict is framed not merely as a struggle for territorial control but as a battle over the future structure of the Sudanese state: whether the resolution will usher in civilian governance or facilitate the perpetuation of old power centers under new guises.
Anti-war groups believe that the inclusion of figures from the dissolved National Congress Party and the Islamic movement in any future political process, without addressing their accountability for the previous ruling period, could offer them a chance to rebuild their political standing by leveraging alliances with military factions. These groups reject the idea of the dialogue initiative becoming a political track independent of a ceasefire, arguing that a protracted war alongside a unilateral political process could entrench existing power dynamics rather than dismantle them.
These factions advocate for an independent peace process free from the dominance of either the army or the Rapid Support Forces, limiting the military's role to security arrangements and cessation of hostilities, while entrusting issues of governance and political transition to civilian leadership. This divergence reflects a broader struggle for Sudan's future, as civilian forces fear that the continuation of the war will weaken democratic elements and cultivate an environment conducive to more organized and opportunistic forces capable of exploiting the chaos, foremost among them the networks of the former regime and the Islamists. Thus, the warning about the return of the Muslim Brotherhood is tied not only to their existence as a political force but also to what civilian groups perceive as an effort to resurrect the previous governing system through a new alliance with the military, exploiting the war and division to regain influence.
While the army posits dialogue as a means to resolve the crisis, civilian groups maintain that any path not commencing with a ceasefire and ensuring the independence of political decision-making from armed influence may yield a different outcome: a realignment of power rather than an end to conflict, and a renewed opportunity for groups connected to the former regime to re-enter the Sudanese political arena.
