Recent military escalations by Houthi militias have reignited discussions about the impact of their continued control over Yemen's telecommunications sector and the vulnerability of liberated areas.
During recent battles and attacks by Houthi forces targeting the liberated areas of the West Coast and Taiz, the extent to which the militias have exploited their control over telecommunications to facilitate their ground operations became evident. From network penetration to surveillance and tracking, the Houthi control over telecommunication companies operating in liberated regions has been a significant tool in their recent military engagements.
The success of the militias in leveraging telecommunications for warfare stems from a decade-long governmental failure to address this critical sector. This failure extends beyond not wresting control of Yemen's telecommunications from the Houthis or compelling operating companies to adhere to the legitimate government's oversight. It also encompasses the inability to establish a dedicated telecommunications system for liberated areas, independent of companies under Houthi control in Sana'a, which has hindered the government's ability to halt their operations in these regions. The absence of viable alternatives for these companies in liberated territories has made banning their activities a difficult decision, despite ongoing reports of their exploitation by the militias.
Since the conflict began in 2015, all governmental attempts to manage telecommunications and establish a separate system for liberated areas, distinct from the Houthi-controlled network, have failed. Experiences with "AdenNet," "Y" (YemenNet), and "SabaFon" have been marked by years of government promises to liberate the sector from Houthi dominance. Despite these past failures, media reports and social media leaks suggest the government may be considering a ban on Houthi-controlled telecommunication companies in liberated areas. The proposed alternative would reportedly involve relaunching SabaFon's operations in these regions, more than seven years after its management relocated to Aden.
In 2019, SabaFon's decision to move its operations to Aden effectively created two entities: one managed from Aden, operating in liberated areas with a network separate from the one controlled by the militias in Sana'a. However, despite this relocation over seven years ago, attempts to fully operationalize it in liberated areas have not succeeded, mirroring the failure of the "Y" company's initiative approximately four years ago. The root cause of these failures is linked to the overarching collapse of the "AdenNet" government project, launched in mid-2018 with the aim of providing 4G services to liberated territories.
The failure of "AdenNet" is attributed to the damage inflicted upon the Aden International Gateway, which was linked to the undersea cable (AAE-1). These facilities were reportedly encrypted by engineers brought from Sana'a under the former Minister of Communications, Lotfi Bashareef. This encryption incident and the government's prolonged inability to address it reveal a critical reason for the legitimacy's failure in the telecommunications sector: the continued international engagement with the Houthi-controlled TeleYemen management in Sana'a, rather than with the administration appointed by the legitimate government in Aden. The refusal to engage with the legitimate government's appointed TeleYemen management in Aden has obstructed efforts to restore the AAE-1 cable and reactivate the Aden International Gateway, consequently stalling all telecommunications projects in liberated areas. This situation casts significant doubt on the viability of relaunching SabaFon in liberated areas and introducing new 4G services, given the government's ongoing struggles in the telecommunications domain. The continued underperformance of the "AdenNet" project, serving a limited number of internet subscribers, and the Houthi control over international communications through TeleYemen in Sana'a underscore this persistent challenge.
