The domestic gas crisis in Yemen's interim capital, Aden, and liberated governorates is escalating, marked by persistent queues at filling stations, widespread public complaints about black marketeers, and contradictory official statements regarding the causes of the shortage and production levels at the Safer gas facilities.
Questions are mounting over the management of the gas sector following conflicting announcements from the Yemen Gas Company. Initially, the company declared the completion of periodic maintenance at Safer's production plants and a gradual increase in output. However, this was shortly followed by news of one production unit shutting down, resulting in a daily loss of approximately 6,000 barrels of gas, equivalent to about 20 tanker trucks.
An official memo from the Yemen Gas Company's Executive Director, Eng. Mohsen bin Hamad bin Waheet, to the Minister of Oil and Minerals revealed that the domestic gas production unit (CPU-2) ceased operations on Tuesday, August 18th. The memo further stated that the shutdown would lead to a daily deficit of around 6,000 barrels, exacerbating an already strained market.
The most striking irony of the crisis is that the announcement of the unit's shutdown occurred just days after official assurances of completed maintenance and rising production. The executive director had previously confirmed the end of maintenance that began on June 26th, emphasizing a gradual production increase and efforts to stabilize the local market. The subsequent revelation of a complete unit shutdown and a deficit of nearly 20 tanker trucks daily has complicated the situation considerably, raising serious doubts about the accuracy of public data and the technical and administrative issues plaguing the gas sector.
The official memo failed to provide a clear, detailed explanation for the sharp decline in the unit's production prior to its shutdown. Data indicates a production drop from 5,816 barrels on August 7th to only 240 barrels shortly before the stoppage, a significant decrease requiring transparent technical clarification, especially following official confirmations of production readiness and improving supplies.
In response, the Ministry of Oil and Minerals offered a broader explanation, attributing the current bottlenecks not to administrative shortcomings or targeted shortages but to a confluence of factors. These include tribal confiscations of gas tankers, the unregulated expansion of gas use in vehicles and commercial establishments, and maintenance work at Safer facilities. According to a ministry statement, gas tankers were subjected to 25 tribal confiscations between January and August 2026, causing a total of 126 days of supply disruptions. The ministry also acknowledged that the increasing shift from gasoline to gas in vehicles and businesses has diverted volumes intended for domestic consumption.
However, placing blame solely on armed factions does not fully account for all aspects of the crisis, particularly its persistence even after the maintenance completion announcement. The ongoing deficit, coupled with the shutdown of a new unit, shifts the focus from transportation and tribal issues to the core management of production, distribution, and oversight. If road blockades are a contributing factor, the shutdown of a production unit and the loss of approximately 6,000 barrels daily represent a distinct problem whose causes need to be publicly disclosed rather than relying on general explanations that do not address the sudden production decline.
Production figures cited in the report, sourced from journalist Ammar Ali Ahmed, suggest a significant drop in Safer's output over recent years. Production reportedly fell from about 128 tanker trucks daily in 2023 to 54, and then to approximately 21 trucks currently. If these figures are accurate, the current crisis may indicate a deeper decline in production capacity rather than a temporary shortage due to maintenance or transport issues, necessitating a comprehensive review of the gas sector from production to distribution and sales points. The danger lies in relying on emergency measures; while redistributing volumes or forming field committees might offer short-term relief, they fail to address the root cause if production capacity is continuously diminishing or if supply chain and distribution management are flawed.
Another issue arises from government policy statements. While citizens face severe shortages of a basic commodity, the Minister of Oil and Minerals discussed the significant resources required to increase production and the option of imports. Concurrently, there are reports of negotiations with Total to resume gas exports from the Balhaf facility. This raises a legitimate question: How can the government simultaneously discuss importing gas to meet domestic needs and resuming exports abroad while the current system struggles to provide cylinders to citizens at official prices? This contradiction, if not clearly explained, poses a true test for gas management policy and reinforces the perception that citizens are a low priority, despite the direct link between domestic gas and household livelihood security.
In the midst of these contradictions, citizens bear the brunt of the crisis. Numerous women and elderly individuals queue for hours at filling stations, while complaints indicate the proliferation of black marketeers and the diversion of supplies to unofficial channels. Citizen testimonies suggest that some quantities allocated for the local market are rerouted to restaurants and hotels or leak into the black market, forcing families to wait extended periods for a single cylinder or purchase them at inflated prices outside official channels. If these complaints are accurate, the problem extends beyond the quantity of gas produced to the authorities' capacity to protect allocated supplies and ensure their delivery to end consumers. Gas produced but not reaching the citizen does not resolve the crisis, nor is increased production sufficient if diversion, monopolies, and black markets persist.
The Ministry of Oil announced several measures, including restructuring distribution, increasing quotas for governorates based on population density, prioritizing domestic consumption, monitoring tanker movements from production sites to filling stations, and forming committees to assess station performance and address violations. The ministry also mentioned coordinating with security and military agencies to protect transport lines and creating a strategic gas reserve in Aden while diversifying supply sources. However, these important measures do not answer the most critical questions: Why has production declined to these levels, and why did a unit shut down shortly after maintenance was declared complete? Furthermore, the continued queues and shortages, even after announcements of increased production, subject government actions to a test of results, not just pronouncements.
The fundamental problem in the gas crisis is not merely a shortage of cylinders or tanker disruptions but the absence of a unified official narrative to explain the situation to the public. The company mentions maintenance, confiscations, and transport security before suddenly announcing a unit shutdown and daily losses of thousands of barrels. Meanwhile, the ministry offers an explanation based on multiple accumulated factors. The market remains choked, and citizens face rising prices, longer queues, and a more active black market. This inconsistency erodes trust in responsible institutions, casting doubt on every new announcement of crisis resolution, especially after recent developments proved that official reassurances can be followed within days by news of new deficits. Therefore, a genuine solution requires not another statement but the disclosure of complete production and distribution figures, identification of the causes for Safer's production decline, clarification of the CPU-2 unit's shutdown reasons, publication of quantities produced and allocated per governorate, and monitoring of tanker movements to sales points.
Citizens need actual gas cylinders at official prices and in a timely manner, rather than further justifications. Continued conflicting statements and the shifting of blame between the company, the ministry, and local authorities will only prolong the crisis, expand the black market, and leave Yemeni families paying the highest price for the mismanagement of a commodity directly linked to daily livelihood security.
